

TO:

File

I 99050012

FROM:

[REDACTED] Audit Advisor and Liaison to the Office of Polar Programs  
via [REDACTED] Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

RE:

[REDACTED]  
Close Out

DATE:

6 January 2000

### Allegation

OIG, through OPP and CPO, received an allegation from the Quality Assurance Inspector (QAI) at the [REDACTED] regarding maintenance work performed on one of its aircraft by [REDACTED]

The QAI said that maintenance records showed that a part that "never fails" had been replaced during isochronal inspections on [REDACTED] in 1998 and again in 1999.

The QAI examined the part that had allegedly been installed during the 1999 isochronal inspection and found it to be unduly worn. He formed the opinion that the part had not been recently installed.

The QAI questioned whether [REDACTED] was using used parts or whether [REDACTED] was charging the government for parts and labor to install parts that were not, in fact, replaced.

[REDACTED] was instructed to retain the part that was removed from the aircraft during the 1999 isochronal inspection so that the QAI could inspect it on an up-coming trip to [REDACTED]

The QAI inspected the part and stated that it was worn.

### Follow-up

During a 6 May 1999 telcon the QAI appeared to be backing off from his prior statements.

The QAI said that the part was not serial number controlled and was probably worth about \$10 (the part in question is a wrap that goes around a pressurized hose).

In May 1999 [REDACTED] OPP, [REDACTED] and DCMC (Defense Contracts Management Command; the entity that administers OPP's contract with [REDACTED] personnel discussed the allegation and it was decided that DCMC would pursue the issue.

I spoke with the Commanding Officer of DCMC, [REDACTED] on 27 May 1999. [REDACTED] related that he had spoken with DCMC Legal, and they had decided on some preliminary steps to pursue. (1) Conduct an engineering review to determine whether there was a condition inherent in the aircraft/system that would make the parts in question fail. (2) Conduct a tracer on the part numbers to determine whether the parts in question came from a particular lot that may have been defective. (3) Perform spot checks on other similar aircraft. We agreed that [REDACTED] was not to be

directly involved or contacted. We also agreed that following completion of these tasks, he would summarize his findings and recommendations and advise same to DCMC Legal and NSF OIG. Based on this discussion, I recommended to NSF OIG's AIGA that this was a prudent course of action and that we await the results of DCMC's research.

I followed up with [REDACTED] on 20 October 1999. [REDACTED] said they had performed preliminary reviews of material and reports, and had interviewed personnel associated with DCMC. He stated that to date nothing had come to their attention that indicated any wrongdoing on the part of [REDACTED]

Spoke with [REDACTED] on the evening of 5 January 2000. Because preliminary review revealed no wrongdoing, [REDACTED] has decided to audit [REDACTED] internal processes. He and his staff are reviewing [REDACTED] processes for maintenance and supply, and DCMC's processes for Quality Assurance sign-offs. This review will focus on what processes are supposed to be followed and whether there are any "holes" in those processes that need to be fixed. He will also review documentation related to the incident in question to determine whether the proper processes were followed (by [REDACTED] and DCMC) and, if not, implement corrective action to ensure that they are followed in the future.

Following this review, a close-out report and recommendation will be forwarded to NSF OIG and DCMC Legal.

### Conclusion

Based on the above and the following, I recommend that with respect to NSF OIG, this allegation be closed:

- (1) The initial findings as reported by [REDACTED]
- (2) Because the part is not serial number controlled, it is unlikely that its origin or disposition could ever be definitively determined.
- (3) The [REDACTED] continues to deliver its aircraft to [REDACTED] for both drop-in and elective maintenance.
- (4) The [REDACTED] have not reported any similar complaints or allegations with respect to subsequent maintenance work performed by [REDACTED]
- (5) [REDACTED]'s position as Commanding Officer of the Defense Contracts Management Command and as Government Flight Representative with responsibility for Department of Defense flight operations for the Pacific Region make it highly unlikely that this issue is not receiving the attention it should receive, and therefore NSF OIG participation is unnecessary.